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Abstract. Cloud Computing provides an optimal infrastructure to 
utilise and share both computational and data resources whilst 
allowing a pay-per-use model, useful to cost-effectively manage 
hardware investment or to maximise its utilisation. Cloud 
Computing also offers transitory access to scalable amounts of 
computational resources, something that is particularly 
important due to the time and financial constraints of many user 
communities. The growing number of communities that are 
adopting large public cloud resources such as Amazon Web 
Services [1] or Microsoft Azure [2] proves the success and hence 
usefulness of the Cloud Computing paradigm. Nonetheless, the 
typical use cases for public clouds involve non-business critical 
applications, particularly where issues around security of 
utilization of applications or deposited data within shared public 
services are binding requisites. In this paper, a use case is 
presented illustrating how the integration of Trusted Computing 
technologies into an available cloud infrastructure – Eucalyptus – 
allows the security-critical energy industry to exploit the 
flexibility and potential economical benefits of the Cloud 
Computing paradigm for their business-critical applications. 
Keywords-component. Cloud Computing, Trusted Computing, 
Cloud Security, energy industry. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many communities have already adopted the ‘cloud’, a 
flexible computational platform allowing scalability and a 
service based provision model. Unfortunately, there are 
currently significant limitations when using a cloud 
infrastructure to perform security-critical computations and/or 
storing sensitive data. Specifically, at the moment there is no 
way to guarantee the trustworthiness of a Virtual Machine 
(VM) in terms of its origin and identity and the trustworthiness 
of the data uploaded and managed by the Elastic Block 
Storage or the Simple Storage Service (S3).1 These limitations 
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are due to the necessity to rely on an untrusted infrastructure – 
the public cloud – in order to instantiate VMs, mount a block 
device or return a data object through a Web Service. Users 
are currently not able to attest that the VM they are using has 
been instantiated from the correspondent image uploaded in 
the S3 service or to attest that the images they uploaded into 
the S3 are the same as those stored in the S3 repository. 
Analogously, users are not able to attest that the data 
contained inside their EBS volumes or those returned by the 
S3 service have not been accessed or altered by other users or 
processes. 
Because of these limitations, public Cloud Computing 
uptake by business-critical communities is limited. A number 
of communities whose emerging information models appear 
otherwise well suited to Cloud Computing are forced either to 
avoid the pay-per-use model of service provision or to deploy 
a private cloud infrastructure. Deploying a private cloud is 
rarely a desirable solution. It requires an extended time frame 
and relevant investment in hardware, management and 
software resources. These limitations also apply to the 
deployment of a private cloud based on open source software 
because while licencing costs are eliminated, the bulk of the 
investment in hardware and support resources is still required. 
Moreover, the available open source cloud solutions – 
Eucalyptus[3], OpenStack[4], OpenNebula[5], Nimbus[6] – 
currently suffer from various limitations, especially as it 
relates to accounting, resource management, reliability and 
scalability.  
The myTrustedCloud project investigated these limitations 
by focusing on a use case involving the highly business-
critical UK energy industry. The requirement for Smart Grids 
implementation [7] means that the energy industry will have to 
leverage increased computational support for organisational 
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would amount to about 3.7Mb, including both network 
diagrams and schedule data. These files would then be merged 
to form a reduced NG GB network model and exchanged back 
to UKPN for further calculations aimed at refining their initial 
load and fault parameter estimations. With current network 
operation procedures there are no other clear calls for 
uploading these data apart from those already mentioned. 
Nonetheless, with the prospect of an increasingly large 
number of embedded and distributed generators, it is likely 
that a greater frequency and increased level of data exchanges 
will be necessary in order to maintain the secure operation and 
stability of the UK electrical network. 
From the description of the use case, three security 
requirements clearly emerge: 
1. Different operators (DNOs i.e. UKPN, TSOs i.e. NG) 
require a diversified access model to the data sharing 
infrastructure. Each operator has to upload its own data 
into a dedicated location that then has to be shared, 
with different privileges, across a known set of other 
operators; 
2. The data exchanged among operators are potentially 
highly sensitive as they describe the state of portions of 
the national transmission and distribution system 
network, an infrastructure of interest for national 
security; 
3. Ownership and integrity of the data set must be trusted 
in order to produce reliable aggregated models. 
In order to match these requirements with the opportunity to 
adopt Cloud Computing, some features of the Trusted 
Computing platform have been implemented into Eucalyptus.  
III.  INTEGRATION OF TRUST & CLOUD 
Trusted Computing enables Eucalyptus users with the 
capability of verifying the integrity of the Virtual Machines 
(VMs) and the EBS volumes they own on the cloud. In this 
scenario, the Trusted Computing framework [15] proposed by 
the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is integrated with 
Eucalyptus so as to provide remote attestation services to 
cloud users.  
Considering the Eucalyptus infrastructure, as depicted in 
Figure 2, the integrity of a VM relies on three components: 
VM, Node Controller (NC) and Storage Controller (SC). 
Attestations of these three components should be made 
separately in order to provide proofs for the integrity of the 
entire VM’s lifecycle. 
• Attestation of VMs. Ensures that only expected 
programs with expected configuration files (including 
the data to process) are loaded inside the VM.  
• Attestation of NCs. Ensures that the expected VM has 
been instantiated and that only an expected software 
stack can manipulate its state. With “expected” we 
denote that the VM the user is currently connecting to, 
is genuinely loaded by the genuine hypervisor with 
specified parameters, including the kernel and root 
images, the networking parameters and the virtual 
storage binding parameters.  
• Attestation of SCs. Ensures that the VM is binding to 
the expected virtual storage, and that the state of the 
virtual storage can only be manipulated by an expected 
software stack. In this context, “expected” denotes that 
the virtual storage connected to the user’s VM is 
genuinely loaded and managed by the genuine EBS 
software with the specified parameters. 
 
Figure 2. Logical layers of the dependencies of VMs on Eucalyptus. 
A. Iterative Attestation 
The attestations of the VM, NC and SC can be performed 
separately. Users initiate three different attestation sessions, 
verify the integrity of all the components and combine the 
results to form an overall attestation. The implementation of 
this process has to take into account at least two problems. 
First, exposing the internal infrastructure of the cloud to the 
users widens the attack surface and violates the principle of 
isolation between VMs and hypervisor. Second, if for every 
client the attestations are delegated to a Trusted Third Party, a 
single-point-of-failure is created that makes the whole 
infrastructure very difficult to scale. 
 
Figure 3. Attestation ticket for the three-layer deep-quote. 
In the myTrustedCloud use case, an iterative attestation 
schema has been adopted, also referred to as deep-quote [16]. 
In this approach, users initiate only one attestation session for 
the VM they are connecting to. The returned attestation ticket 
incorporates three separate parts, representing respectively the 
integrity of the VM, that of the NC hosting the VM and that of 
the SC hosting the EBS volumes. As depicted in Figure 3, the 
first part of the returning attestation ticket contains the 
Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values recorded in the 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the VM; the second part of 
the ticket contains the PCR values of the NC hosting the VM; 
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may offer a richer authentication and authorisation model but 
from a functional point of view, the choice of the cloud 
infrastructure makes no difference for the design of the use 
case. 
From a security point of view it is assumed that: 
1. Each DNO and NG own a private/public key pair; 
2. NG and DNOs share their public keys; 
3. NG and DNOs have access to a trusted hash value 
of their respective root, kernel and initrd images. 
The hash value is published encrypted and signed 
by the images provider(s); 
4. NG and DNOs have access to a trusted hash value 
for the NC and SC of Eucalyptus provided by a 
trusted Eucalyptus distribution authority; 
5. The Eucalyptus infrastructure is integrated with the 
Trusted Computing technology as described in 
Section III. In this way, the hash value of an 
instantiated VM and its kernel are available to the 
VM owner; the DNOs and NG can run/interrogate 
an OpenPTS server in order to get the hash value 
for the NC, SC, Cimphony and every other relevant 
software installed either in their VMs, or on the 
systems running the NC and SC. 
Each DNO workflow is as follows: 
1. instantiate a VM from a root image stored in the 
Eucalyptus Walrus storage service; 
2. Verify that the VM, NC and SC can be trusted by 
means of the OpenPTS server and the trusted hash 
values published by the image providers and the 
cloud distributor; 
3. Upload the network model; 
4. Validate the network model by means of the 
Cimphony software; 
5. Encrypt and sign the data set of the validated model 
respectively with the NG public key and DNO 
private key; 
6. Create and attach an EBS volume to the current VM 
tagging it with the name and time/date stamp. 
7. Store the encrypted model into the EBS; 
8. Unmount and detach the EBS volume; 
9. Destroy the VM. 
The NG workflow is as follows: 
1. Instantiate a VM from a root image stored in the 
Walrus storage service; 
2. Verify that the VM, NC and SC can be trusted by 
means of the OpenPTS server and the trusted hash 
values published by the image providers and the 
cloud distributor; 
3. Mount each DNO EBS volume tagged with a 
time/date stamp less than an hour old; 
4. Decrypt and verify the signature of each model 
contained in each mounted DNO EBS volume; 
5. Merge all the DNO models; 
6. Convert the resulting model from CIM to PSS/E 
format; 
7. Elaborate the model on the VM or download it 
through an encrypted channel; 
8. Destroy the VM. 
It should be noted that all the operations involving trust 
verification, encryption, decryption, signing and signature 
verification, creating, attaching, tagging, mounting and 
unmounting EBS volumes can be automated. Furthermore, 
Cimphony has been modified to provide feedback information 
to the users about its own trustworthiness and that of the 
infrastructure on which it is running. 
The trustworthiness of the VM and its kernel is assessed by 
comparing three hash values: that of the running VM/kernel, 
that of the VM/kernel images stored in the Walrus storage 
service and that of the VM/kernel image as supplied by the 
image providers. This comparison is secured by the 
public/private key infrastructure and allows trusting the 
running image even on a potentially insecure cloud 
infrastructure. While a trusted cloud infrastructure can still be 
vulnerable to attacks and bugs, the possibility to verify that the 
running VM has not been altered from the one supplied by the 
VM image providers guarantees that the VM itself has not 
been compromised independently from whether the underlying 
cloud infrastructure has been compromised. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSYS 
The integration of trusted computing and cloud computing 
introduces performance overheads in the system bootstrapping 
and remote attestation procedures. The bootstrapping of a 
trusted operating system includes the building of a chain-of-
trust. This is a time consuming operation in which the IMA-
enabled kernel measures the hash value of each executable, 
kernel module and relevant configuration file during the 
bootstrapping procedure. In the case of the prototype 
presented in this paper, a chain-of-trust must be built for the 
physical machines on which the NC and SC are executed and 
for each VM instantiated on the NC. The added overhead on 
their boot time is measured with bootchart [26]. In the case of 
the VM, the bootstrap time is calculated from when the 
QEMU command is invoked to when the logging console of 
the VM is ready. The time taken to copy the VM images from 
the SC to NC is ignored as it is unaffected by building the 
chain-of-trust. The physical machines of our testing 
infrastructure are equipped with Intel Core i5-2400 Quad, 
16GB of ram, a TPM module integrated into the motherboard 
and deployed with Ubuntu 11.04. 
Table 1 shows the results of the performance 
measurements. The bootstrapping delay of trusted NC and SC 
is significant, requiring around three times more than their 
untrusted counterparts. However, the operational impact of 
such overhead on a typical deployment environment is 
negligible as it is experienced only when a physical machine is 
rebooted. This is usually a scheduled event and high-
availability and service redundancy are usually adopted in 
order to manage unscheduled outage. Conversely, the 
bootstrapping delay measured when instantiating a VM is 
minimal. This is due to the adoption of software-TPMs, within 
which the TPM_Extend operation is much faster than its 
hardware-TPM counterparts. 
  
Concerning the overhead of the remote attestation 
procedure, the three-step iterative attestation schema adopted 
in myTrustedCloud takes around 1:18 minutes (N = 15, SD = 
2.5s). The attestation delay is due to the time required for 
generating and verifying the integrity reports, together with 
the time required for quoting and verifying the PCRs. 
Assuming that the attestation is performed regularly, as the 
states – i.e. the loaded software components – of the controller 
nodes of a production cloud infrastructure seldom change [27], 
the PCRs and integrity reports are going to be the same most 
of the times. As a consequence, the attestation throughput can 
be improved by first quoting and verifying the PCRs and then 
comparing them with the latest values. In this way, the 
integrity report is only generated and verified when the PCRs 
are changed. Adopting this approach generally allows to 
reduce the attestation overhead to no more than 10 seconds. 
System  
type 
Boot  
time 
(minutes) 
Standard 
deviation 
(seconds) 
Trusted NC 3:18 3.8 
Untrusted NC 0:57 4 
Trusted SC 3:05 4 
Untrusted SC 1:02 0.5 
Trusted VM () 1:01 1.5 
Trusted VM with disk hash (2gb) 1:07 1.3 
Untrusted VM 0:57 1.4 
Table 1. Boot time of trusted and untrusted systems. Number of observations: 
N = 15. Every measurement has been performed on a standard installation of 
Eucalyptus 2 as packaged and provided by Canonical for Ubuntu 11.04. No 
additional load was present on the infrastructure when the measurements were 
performed. 
VI. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES ANALYSYS 
A full threat and vulnerability analysis for cloud computing is 
out of scope for this paper and a production-ready, trusted 
cloud infrastructure for the energy sector would have to meet 
several types of security requirements of which trusted 
computing is one important example. The presented approach 
concentrates upon mitigation of the risks which would arise 
from the insertion of rogue analysis code into the cloud, which 
would have consequences for the confidentiality of the data 
and the integrity of results.  
With a Trusted Computing infrastructure, a remote party 
can undeniably attest the current configuration of a platform, 
including the version of all the loaded software components 
and their configurations. As a consequence, changes made by 
malicious administrators or privileged malicious users can be 
genuinely recorded. Moreover, Dynamic Root of Trust for 
Measurement (DRTM) [28] can be used to establish the 
runtime chain-of-trust so to protect critical components on the 
system against runtime attacks, e.g. the hypervisor. However, 
for unprivileged malicious users it is not feasible to measure 
and record the configurations of all the VMs running on the 
same platform with the target user VM. Nonetheless, the 
genuine enforcement of the countermeasures against these 
attacks, e.g. side-channels, can still be attested. As usual, it is 
assumed that hardware cannot be manipulated without being 
identified, i.e. the TPM cannot be tampered with, and insider 
physical attacks such as the cold boot attack are not 
considered. 
The trusted computing infrastructure as presented in this 
paper could suffer from a well-known potential privacy 
leakage. The problem is that the remote attestation reveals the 
detailed configuration of a platform. This information can 
easily be obtained by attackers and used for system profiling. 
Property-based attestation [29] has been proposed as a solution 
to this problem. In this type of attestation, platform 
configurations would be mapped to a set of properties on 
which attestations would be enforced. In order to adopt a 
property-based attestation, a set of properties mappings for all 
the software components used within the cloud infrastructure 
should be provided. This set of properties should also be 
certified by a reputable Trusted Third Party. 
The so called time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) is 
another well-known potential security issue of a trusted 
computing platform. As seen in the previous sections, in a 
trusted computing scenario software components are measured 
before being loaded. As a consequence, malicious code 
directly injected into memory through runtime attacks cannot 
be measured – e.g. stack-overflow attacks. The DRTM 
discussed above mitigates this kind of attacks. However, 
DTRM requires modifications of the cloud software stack, 
modifications that would have to be considered for a 
production-ready, trusted cloud infrastructure. 
A natural piece of further work will be to build the 
infrastructure necessary to log and evaluate the measurement 
data generated and received, and to use it systematically to 
ensure the provenance of the reported results.  There is every 
reason to presume that this is feasible, but only a large-scale 
deployment can properly validate it. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The myTrustedCloud use case grounded on the integration of 
Trusted Computing Components with a cloud platform shows 
how Cloud Computing can be a viable solution for 
communities with high data integrity requirements. The 
security models adopted by the public, private or hybrid cloud 
systems currently available are not suitable for the 
requirements of the energy industry and their use cases. As 
such, we have developed a prototype of trust-capable cloud 
infrastructure based upon a publically available cloud 
infrastructure solution. The solution developed through the 
project has been integrated in such a way that it interacts with 
the lowest level of virtualisation software. This has meant that 
there has not been a need to alter any of the Eucalyptus 
software and so the scheme chosen will work for any of the 
previously mentioned open source cloud solutions. 
The implementation of the use case described in Section IV 
showed that a trusted-enabled Cloud Computing platform is a 
viable solution for the security requirements of the UK 
transmission and distribution network business sector. In a 
model based on the greater interoperability between active 
distribution and transmission networks the trusted cloud 
  
infrastructure that we have developed allows in principle a 
dynamic, fast and secure management of the information 
generated and elaborated on both sides. Further research and 
development is required in order to translate the proposed 
prototype into a production infrastructure. 
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